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SURETYSHIP PRINCIPLES IN THE NEW ARTICLE 3:
CLARIFICATIONS AND SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES*
Neil B. Cohen**
I. INTRODUCTION
"For some unfathomable reason, the courts have historically
taken a particular interest in surety law,"' a bankruptcy court
judge lamented recently The reason is not so unfathomable,
though. Courts have taken a particular interest in suretyship be-
cause they have had no choice. Suretyship is a major economic
activity which gives rise to frequent litigation.
Moreover, while suretyship may be important economically,
courts have had to take a particular interest in surety law because,
for the most part, nobody else has. Suretyship law has ancient
roots and a venerable history2 but, at least in late twentieth cen-
tury American law, it has not had much of a present. While the use
of suretyship in commercial transactions is expanding rapidly, the
availability of source material for the jurist, practitioner, academic
or student who seeks an understanding of the area is not keeping
pace. Indeed, from the dearth of suretyship materials available,
one might draw the conclusion that materials on suretyship law
ought to be catalogued and shelved with legal history materials.3
* Copyright 1991 Neil B. Cohen.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Reporter, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
(THIRD) SURETYSHIP. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author, and not of
the American Law Institute.
1. In re Murchison, 102 Bankr. 545, 547 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
2. See generally Loyd, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1917).
3. Indeed, it is the surprising truth that the three newest comprehensive sources of
suretyship law are all over forty years old. The first of these sources is the Restatement of
the Law of Security, promulgated in 1941. More "recent" are the Handbook on the Law of
Suretyship by Lawrence Simpson, published in 1950, and the fifth edition of A. Stearns,
The Law of Suretyship (J. Elder ed.), published in 1951. In sum, current source material on
the law of suretyship is virtually nonexistent. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY
(1941); L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP (1950); A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF
SURETYSHIP (J. Elder 5th ed. 1951).
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The primary exception to the lack of modern thinking about
suretyship law has been the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."
or "Code"). The Code contains a significant amount of law gov-
erning suretyship situations, most particularly in Article 3. Article
3, both in its original form and in its current revision, provides a
set of rules governing the rights and responsibilities of parties to
negotiable instruments who fulfill the economic function of
sureties.
Before examining the suretyship rules embodied in Article 3,
however, it is helpful to set forth briefly the common law founda-
tion on which those rules rest. Suretyship is a three-party
relationship involving the creditor, the principal debtor and the
surety Essentially, the surety's role is to stand behind the
debtor's obligation to the creditor.' As between the debtor and the
surety, the debtor is primarily liable on the obligation.' From the
creditor's perspective, though, the identity of the party who will
ultimately bear the cost of performance is not significant; what
matters is that the creditor may demand payment from two differ-
ent parties-the debtor and the surety-if the obligation is not
paid. 7
The surety has various rights against the principal debtor so
that it can be made whole if it is made to pay the obligation. Three
legal theories are available to the surety in this situation. First, the
surety has the right of "exoneration." Exoneration is essentially an
equitable cause of action against the principal debtor to compel it
to pay the obligation.8 Second, the surety has the right of reim-
bursement; that is, the surety may recover from the principal
debtor the amount paid on account of the obligation.9 Third, the
surety has the right to be subrogated to the creditor's rights. The
subrogation right is the right to be substituted to the position of
the creditor; it is a form of equitable assignment. 10
Finally, the surety has some special defenses to the duty to
stand behind the debtor's obligation. These defenses exist largely
4. See L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 2 (1950).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 6.
7. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY § 82 (1941); L. SIMPSON, supra note 4, at
2.
8. See L. SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 198-204.
9. See id. at 224-30.
10. See id. at 205-06.
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to protect sureties in situations where the creditor takes an action
that harms the surety's ability to recover from the principal debtor
and thereby increases the surety's ultimate economic burden.11
Suretyship law presumes that the surety has not consented to such
an action and, accordingly, the law may release the surety from its
obligations if the creditor acts in such a way as to harm the
surety's ability to recover from the principal debtor. 12
One of the most common settings for the suretyship obligation
is a negotiable instrument. There are a number of ways in which a
surety may embody its obligation on a negotiable instrument. Most
commonly, perhaps, the principal debtor is the maker of a note,
while the surety is an indorser or guarantor. As an indorser, the
surety essentially contracts that it will pay the note if the maker
dishonors it. 13 A surety, however, can obligate itself by entering
into any of the contracts of a party to an instrument. 4
When the surety and the principal debtor are both parties to a
negotiable instrument, Article 3 of the U.C.C. provides the rules
governing the rights and duties of the parties to this three-party
relationship. Former Article 3 provides a substantial body of rules
in this area. While the rules are workable for the most part, they
suffer from the inconsistent drafting that plagues much of former
Article 3 and embody an odd mix of new rules and incorporation of
the common law. Perhaps the severest critic of the former Article 3
suretyship rules has been Professor Ellen Peters, who is now Chief
Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Chief Justice Peters
wrote:
"[T]he principal weakness of the Code's Article 3 sections dealing
with suretyship obligations is not so much the absence of definitive
solutions but the failure to establish any consistent pattern of legis-
lative intervention. At some points, the sections dictate with
fanatical and misguided precision what the suretyship obligation
may or may not contain. At other junctures, the sections contain
entirely unguided references to large bodies of perhaps inapplicable
local law. Only rarely does the Code specify for the parties and the
11. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY §§ 122-24, 126-32 & 135
(1941).
12. See generally id.
13. See U.C.C. § 3-414 (1989); U.C.C. § 3-415 (1990). [This Article, for purposes of
clarity, distinquishes between citations to the former and revised U.C.C. sections by citing,
respectively, to the 1989 and 1990 U.C.C.]
14. See L. SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 32.
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courts those degrees of freedom which the Code decided, correctly,
to preserve."15
This Article compares the treatment of suretyship principles
under the former version of Article 3 and under the revised version
of Article 3 which was recently promulgated by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute. 1 Where the differences are minor, the
differences are set forth and explained. Where the differences are
more substantial, however, an analysis and critique of the new ver-
sion is provided.
II. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 3 SURETYSHIP RULES
A. Background
Former Article 3 applied suretyship concepts primarily in
U C.C. sections 3-415, 3-416 and 3-606. 1' The analogous sections in
the revised version of Article 3 are sections 3-419 and 3-605.11
Close examination of these sections reveals that the rights and ob-
ligations of parties to a suretyship arrangement governed by either
version of Article 3 differ in some significant ways from those
rights and obligations of parties provided by the general law of
suretyship. Accordingly, it is important to note as a preliminary
matter that, for the most part, the suretyship principles of Article
3 apply only to situations involving an "accommodation party " An
accommodation party is essentially a surety who has effectuated
that status by signing the instrument. 9 Typically, then, an accom-
modation party will be a comaker or indorser, although a guaranty
on the instrument will also suffice.20 One can become a surety with
respect to an instrument without being an accommodation party,
however. One who becomes a surety without signing the instru-
ment-by, for example, signing a separate guaranty-is a surety
15. Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J
833, 879 (1968).
16. U.C.C. art. 3 (1990).
17. U.C.C. §§ 3-415, 3-416 & 3-606 (1989).
18. U.C.C. §§ 3-419 & 3-605 (1990).
19. See infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
20. Revised Article 3 makes it clear that such a guaranty is a form of indorsement.
U.C.C. § 3-419(d) (1990).
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but not an accommodation party 21 Thus, the rights of parties to a
suretyship arrangement with respect to commercial paper may also
be governed by general suretyship law, rather than by the princi-
ples enunciated in Article 3.22 While it is sensible for the scope of
Article 3 rules to be limited to rights created "on the paper," the
result under former Article 3 is that two functionally identical
credit enhancements of an item of commercial paper can be gov-
erned by two different bodies of law. This situation is undesirable,
to say the least.
Did the drafters of former Article 3 intend this anomalous re-
sult? It is difficult to say The 1952 official draft of U.C.C. section
3-415(1) defined an accommodation party as "one who signs the
instrument in any capacity as surety for another party to it. '23 The
comment to this section indicated that the use of the word surety
was "intended to incorporate the entire background of the law of
suretyship as applied to negotiable instruments. ' 24 Yet, as a result
of some heated debate before the New York Law Revision Com-
mission, the provision and the comment were deleted.25 Thus, the
intent of the drafters with respect to possible inconsistencies be-
tween the suretyship rules in former Article 3 and those in the
common law is difficult to discern.
Regardless of the intent of the drafters of the original Article 3
in this area, the drafters of the revised version are apparently com-
fortable with the idea of limiting the applicability of the revised
Article 3 suretyship rules to accommodation parties and leaving
other sureties to the common law. Revised Article 3 provides sure-
tyship rules only for accommodation parties, who are defined as,
inter alia, parties to the instrument.26
21. U.C.C. § 3-419(a) & comment 1 (1990); see U.C.C. § 3-415(1) & comment 1 (1989).
22. See, e.g., Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wisc. 2d 26, 34-44, 330 N.W.2d 201,
207-09 (1983).
23. U.C.C. § 3-415(1) (1952).
24. Id. § 3-415 comment 1.
25. See 1 N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, 1954 Report 208-09, 253, 274, 428 & 461
(1954); 2 N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, 1955 Report 1168 (1955); PERMANENT EDITORIAL
BOARD FOR U.C.C., 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS 411 (1956).
26. See U.C.C. § 3-419(1) (1990); see also infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
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B. Accommodation Parties
While both the former and the revised versions of Article 3
provide special rules for "accommodation parties," the two statutes
define that term differently Former U.C.C. section 3-415(1) de-
fined an accommodation party as "one who signs the instrument in
any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party
to it."27 While the somewhat archaic language of this provision is
suggestive of pseudonyms and aliases, it is clear that the intent
was to refer to sureties. Indeed, official comment 1 to former
U C.C. section 3-415 provided that "an accommodation party is al-
ways a surety (which includes a guarantor), and it is his only
distinguishing feature. He differs from other sureties only in that
his liability is on the instrument and he is surety for another party
to it.""' Despite the awkward language, it does not appear that
courts have missed the point.
Revised Article 3 defines "accommodation party" somewhat
differently U.C.C. section 3-419(a) provides:
If an instrument is issued for value given for the benefit of a party
to the instrument ("accommodated party") and another party to the
instrument ("accommodation party") signs the instrument for the
purpose of incurring liability on the instrument without being a di-
rect beneficiary of the value given for the instrument, the
instrument is signed by the accommodation party "for
accommodation. 29
The drafters improved the definition of "accommodation
party" by discarding the perhaps chivalrous concept of lending
one's name to another party and by adopting instead the economic
concept of incurring liability without being a direct beneficiary of
the value given for the benefit of another party Nonetheless, the
drafters could have provided even greater clarity by defining "di-
rect beneficiary," since the meaning of this term is not always as
obvious as the official comment to revised U.C.C. section 3-419
suggests.
The comment indicates that the statute simply "distinguishes
between direct and indirect benefit," citing as an example of an
27. U.C.C. § 3-415(1) (1989).
28. Id. § 3-415 comment 1.
29. U.C.C. § 3-419(a) (1990).
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indirect benefit a sole stockholder cosigning a note with a corpora-
tion for a loan given to that corporation. 30 While the example given
by the comment is clearly correct because the stockholder's benefit
is only derivative and thus "indirect, '31 it is not hard to imagine
situations where the distinction between direct and indirect bene-
fits is not so obvious. Consider, for example, the following
situation: T, a tenant who lives in rented premises with his adult
daughter, S, is six months behind on his rent. L, the landlord, is
seeking to collect the back rent or, in the alternative, evict T
While S lives with her father, only her father is named on the lease
and, thus, only he is responsible for the rent and is the defendant
in L's action. In order to avoid eviction, T and S cosign a note for
the back rent. Is S an accommodation party? Instinct suggests that
the answer is yes. After all, the debt was owed by T, not S. But the
note was issued in exchange for L's agreement not to proceed with
eviction, which would have left T and S homeless. Was not S a
direct beneficiary of that value? If she was a direct beneficiary,
under revised section 3-419(1),2 S would not be an accommodation
party This hypothetical illustrates the potential difficulties with
the language of the revision. More guidance from the drafters on
the issue of "direct beneficiary" would be helpful here.
Former Article 3 recognized at least five different types of ac-
commodation parties, each with its own contractual obligation.
First, an accommodation party could be a maker (or comaker) of
the instrument.33 In such a case, the party accommodated (i.e., the
principal debtor) was either another comaker or, perhaps, an in-
dorser. As a maker, the accommodation party entered into the
contract of a maker, agreeing to pay the instrument according to
its tenor at the time of his or her engagement. 34
Second, an accommodation party could be an indorser of the
negotiable instrument.3 In that case, the party accommodated was
typically the maker or drawer of the instrument. As an indorser,
the accommodation party entered into the indorser's contract,
30. Id. § 3-419 comment 1.
31. See id. But see FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1990).
32. U.C.C. § 3-419(1) (1990).
33. See U.C.C. § 3-415 comment 1 (1989); R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 3-415:27 (3d ed. 1984).
34. U.C.C. § 3-413(1) (1989).
35. See id. § 3-415 comment 1; see also R. ANDERSON, supra note 33, § 3-415:28.
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which provided that, upon dishonor and any necessary notice of
dishonor or protest, the indorser would pay the instrument.36
Third, an accommodation party could be an acceptor of a
draft. 7 In that case, the accommodated party would typically be
the drawer.
Finally, the accommodation party could be one of two special
types of indorser. s If the accommodation party added the words
"payment guaranteed," or their equivalent, to the indorsement, he
or she entered into a variant of the indorser's contract.3 9 Under
this contract, the indorser engaged that "if the instrument is not
paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor without resort
by the holder to any other party "40 Thus, the indorser who guar-
anteed payment of an instrument essentially waived not only the
requirements of dishonor of the instrument and any necessary no-
tice of dishonor and protest, but also all demand whatsoever
against the maker or drawee, as a condition of his liability 4 His
liability was, for all practical purposes, that of a comaker.42
On the other hand, if the accommodation party added the
words "collection guaranteed," or their equivalent, to his indorse-
ment, he entered into a different variant of the indorser's contract.
He engaged that
if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according to its
tenor, but only after the holder has reduced his claim against the
maker or acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned un-
satisfied, or after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is
otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against him.4"
Thus, "[a] guaranty of collection likewise waives formal present-
ment, notice of dishonor and protest, but requires that the holder
first proceed against the maker or acceptor by suit and execution,
or show that such proceeding would be useless.""
36. U.C.C. § 3-414(l) (1989).
37. See id. § 3-415 comment 1.
38. See id. § 3-416.
39. Id. § 3-416(1).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 3-416 comment.
42. See id.
43. Id. § 3-416(2).
44. Id. § 3-416 comment.
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Finally, if an indorser added ambiguous words of guaranty to
his signature, they were to be interpreted as a guaranty of pay-
ment, rather than collection.45
Under the revised version of Article 3, there are also several
types of accommodation parties, with the liability of each depend-
ing on the particular contract entered into by that party First, the
accommodation party can be an "issuer," which is the revised Arti-
cle's collective term for makers and drawers.46 Second, the
accommodation party may have entered into the contract of an
indorser.47
Unlike former Article 3, the revision does not contain the con-
cept of a payment guaranty 48 Apparently, the drafters decided
that nothing was accomplished by the payment guaranty that
could not also be accomplished by an ordinary indorsement com-
bined with a waiver of presentment and dishonor. "Payment
guaranteed" was good shorthand for this package of rights, how-
ever, and it is not clear why the drafters of the revised Article 3
chose to eliminate it. Revised Article 3 does, however, retain the
concept of a collection guaranty in section 3-419(d).49
III. RIGHTS OF THE SURETY AGAINST THE PRINcIPAL DEBTOR
The rights of a surety as against the principal debtor were set
forth in former U.C.C. section 3-415. 5o That section provided that
"[a]n accommodation party is not liable to the party accommo-
dated, and if he pays the instrument has a right of recourse on the
45. Id. § 3-416(3).
46. U.C.C. § 3-105(c) (1990).
47. See id. § 3-415(a).
48. See U.C.C. § 3-416(1) (1989).
49. Revised section 3-419(d) provides:
If the signature of a party to an instrument is accompanied by words indicating
unambiguously that the party is guaranteeing collection rather than payment of the
obligation of another party to the instrument, the signer is obliged to pay the amount
due on the instrument to a person entitled to enforce the instrument only if (i) execu-
tion of judgment against the other party has been returned unsatisfied, (ii) the other
party is insolvent or in an insolvency proceeding, (iii) the other party cannot be
served with process, or (iv) it is otherwise apparent that payment cannot be obtained
from the other party.
U.C.C. § 3-419(d) (1990).
50. See U.C.C. § 3-415 (1989).
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instrument against such party "51 This codified, in a way, the tradi-
tional suretyship right of subrogation. Former Article 3 was silent,
however, about whether the accommodation party had the rights
of reimbursement or exoneration.2
A close reading of former U.C.C. section 3-415(5) would seem
to lead to the conclusion that Article 3 eliminated the right of ex-
oneration. The section provided recourse only for an
accommodation party who "pays" the instrument; no right was
given to compel the principal debtor to pay first. 3 Whether the
right to exoneration entered the equation through the gate pro-
vided by U C.C. section 1-10314 was unclear.
Nothing in former Article 3, however, addressed the reim-
bursement rights of accommodation parties. Nonetheless,
commentators have consistently concluded that, under former Ar-
ticle 3, accommodation parties did have the right of
reimbursement. 5 The courts have been in agreement, some finding
reimbursement rights inherent in former U C.C. section 3-415(5)" 6
and others introducing the concept through U.C.C. section 1-103.Y1
Perhaps former Article 3's silence about the right of reim-
bursement was conceptually justified. Article 3, for the most part,
only governs rights and liabilities relating to the instrument. The
right of reimbursement, though, is not a right on the instrument.
Even if the silence regarding the right to reimbursement was justi-
fied, however, the result, like so much of the interrelationship
between Article 3 and suretyship law, was unnecessarily confusing.
The revision of Article 3 resolves the reimbursement issue by
explicitly granting the accommodation party who pays an instru-
51. Id. § 3-415(5).
52. See generally U.C.C. art. 3 (1989); see also id. § 3-415.
53. Id. § 3-415(5).
54. Section 1-103 provides:
Unless displaced by particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity,
including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and
agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
U.C.C. § 1-103 (1989).
55. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-19, at n.4 (3d
ed. 1988); Peters, supra note 15, at 869 n.151.
56. See, e.g., Ilg v. Andrews, 10 Wash. App. 936, 520 P.2d 1385 (1974).
57. See, e.g., Warren v. Washington Trust Bank, 19 Wash. App. 348, 575 P.2d 1077
(1978), modified, 92 Wash. 2d 318, 598 P.2d 701 (1979).
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ment a right of reimbursement.58 The revised Article, however,
maintains its predecessor's silence regarding any right of exonera-
tion which the surety may have. 9
IV DEFENSES OF THE SURETY
A. Defenses of the Pnncipal Debtor
One of the issues left unresolved by the text of former Article
3 was whether an accommodation party could raise the defenses of
the principal debtor as a defense against enforcement of the in-
strument by the holder.6 0 Former U.C.C. section 3-306(d)
embodied the law's general bias against raising claims or defenses
of third parties.6 1 That section provided that, with two limited ex-
ceptions, "[t]he claim of any third person to the instrument is not
otherwise available as a defense to any party liable thereon unless
the third person himself defends the action for such party ,,62 That
rule was not, however, generally applied to accommodation parties.
Under the common law of suretyship, however, most defenses
of the principal debtor could be raised by the surety "[T]he gen-
eral principle [is] that since the surety's obligation is based upon
the existence of a duty of principal and creditor, the creditor can-
not recover from the surety when the creditor's conduct gives the
principal a defense ",63 Among the defenses of the principal
debtor which could not be raised by the surety are the principal's
lack of capacity64 and discharge of the principal in bankruptcy
proceedings. 5
The revision of Article 3 provides an explicit answer to the
issue of available defenses for an accommodation party That an-
swer generally parallels the common law:
In an action to enforce the obligation of an accommodation party to
pay an instrument, the accommodation party may assert against the
person entitled to enforce the instrument any defense or claim in
58. See U.C.C. § 3-419(e) (1990).
59. See generally id. § 3-419.
60. See generally Peters, supra note 15, at 862.
61. U.C.C. § 3-306(d) (1989).
62. Id.
63. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY § 126 comment a (1941).
64. See id. § 125.
65. See generally L. SIMPSON, supra note 4, at 308-11.
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recoupment under subsection (a) that the accommodated party
could assert against the person entitled to enforce the instrument,
except the defenses of discharge in insolvency proceedings, infancy,
or lack of legal capacity. 6
The revision provides that the surety can only raise defenses that
the accommodated party could assert against the person entitled
to enforce the instrument. Thus, if the person enforcing the instru-
ment is a holder in due course, the accommodated party could
raise only the real defenses listed in revised U C.C. section
3-305(a)(1).17
B. Suretyship Defenses
The bulk of the Article 3 suretyship rules concern the scope of
suretyship defenses and the ability of an accommodation party to
assert them. Former U C.C. section 3-606, one of the more opaque
provisions of the U.C.C., provided that a holder discharged a
surety if the holder, without the consent of the surety, either (a)
released or agreed not to sue the principal debtor (whether or not
the principal debtor is a party to the instrument) without ex-
pressly reserving rights against the surety if the relationship
between the principal debtor and the surety was known to the
holder, or (b) unjustifiably impaired collateral for the instrument
given by a principal debtor.6 8 It is notable that there was no refer-
ence in former U.C.C. section 3-606 to extensions of time granted
by the creditor.69 Most commentators, however, agree that an ex-
tension of time should be treated in the same way as a release.7 °
1. Discharges, Extensions and Modifications.-The revised
version of Article 3 makes several major changes in the area of
suretyship defenses. Most dramatically, it provides that
"[d]ischarge, under Section 3-604, of the obligation of a party to
pay an instrument does not discharge the obligation of an indorser
66. U.C.C. § 3-305(d) (1990).
67. Id. § 3-305(a)(1).
68. See U.C.C. § 3-606 (1989).
69. See id. In a minority of jurisdictions, the surety is also discharged if the creditor,
after demand by the surety, does not proceed against the debtor. See Pain v. Packard, 13
Johns. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816).
70. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-15 (3d ed.
1988).
606 [Vol. 42:2:595
Suretyship Principles
or accommodation party having a right of recourse against the dis-
charged party ,,71
This would appear, at first glance, 'to signal a total departure
from the venerable doctrine that release of the principal discharges
the surety.72 Yet, closer examination reveals that the change is not
as great as it appears. According to the official comment, if the
accommodation party pays the holder he can recover from the
principal debtor under his right of reimbursement provided in re-
vised U.C.C. section 3-419(e). s Thus, it appears that the result
flowing from discharge of the principal debtor is the same as would
occur under former law if the discharge were accompanied by "res-
ervation of rights" against the surety Indeed, official comment 3 to
revised section 3-605 explicitly repudiates the doctrine of reserva-
tion of rights: "The reservation of rights doctrine is abolished in
Section 3-605 with respect to rights on instruments. '74
While the reservation of rights doctrine may, indeed, have out-
lived its usefulness, it has not yet been generally repudiated in the
general law of suretyship. Thus, it is not clear whether this depar-
ture from generally applicable surety principles will create an
island of inconsistency or will spur the common law to follow suit.
In any event, regardless of the wisdom of this apparent change, the
change is far from clear from the text of the statute itself.
Standing in contrast to revised U.C.C. section 3-605(b), how-
ever, are revised U.C.C. sections 3-605(c) and (d). Those sections
provide:
(c) If a person entitled to enforce an instrument agrees, with or
without consideration, to an extension of the due date of the obliga-
tion of a party to pay the instrument, the extension discharges an
indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse against
the party whose obligation is extended to the extent the indorser or
accommodation party proves that the extension caused loss to the
indorser or accommodation party with respect to the right of
recourse.
71. U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1990).
72. RESTATEMENT OF TE LAW OF SECURITY § 122 (1941) ("Where the creditor releases
a principal, the surety is discharged, unless (a) the surety consents to remain liable notwith-
standing the release, or (b) the creditor in the release reserves his rights against the
surety.").
73. U.C.C. § 3-605 comment 3 (1990). See id. § 3-419(e).
74. Id. § 3-605 comment 3.
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(d) If a person entitled to enforce an instrument agrees, with or
without consideration, to a material modification of the obligation of
a party other than an extension of the due date, the modification
discharges the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party
having a right of recourse against the person whose obligation is
modified to the extent the modification causes loss to the indorser or
accommodation party with respect to the right of recourse. The loss
suffered by the indorser or accommodation party as a result of mod-
ification is equal to the amount of the right of recourse unless the
person enforcing the instrument proves that no loss was caused by
the modification or that the loss caused by the modification was an
amount less than the amount of the right of recourse."
Thus, while under subsection (b) a complete discharge of the
principal debtor will not release the accommodation party, a mere
extension of time may do so under subsection (c), and a material
modification of the principal debtor's obligation, which might fall
significantly short of an outright discharge, may do so under sub-
section (d). Moreover, the discharge of the accommodation party
under these sections cannot be prevented by the simple expedient
of a reservation of rights. The major exception to the discharges
under subsections (c) and (d) is provided in revised U.C.C. section
3-605(i), which states that there is no discharge if the accommoda-
tion party has consented or waived its rights.76 Once again, the
revised provisions, regardless of their merits, appear to be incon-
gruent with the general law of suretyship. 71
Revised U C.C. section 3-605(b), then, can be seen to have
given additional flexibility to creditors; they can settle claims
against principal debtors for less than their full amount without
worrying that the release of the principal debtor will release the
surety Revised U.C.C. sections 3-605(c) and 3-605(d), on the other
hand, have taken flexibility away from creditors. Whereas under
former law, the creditor who agreed to a change in the principal
debtor's obligation can avoid discharge of a surety by reserving
rights against the surety,78 under the revised provisions there is al-
ways a chance that an accommodation party who has not
consented or waived suretyship defenses will be discharged.
75. U.C.C. § 3-605(c) & (d) (1990).
76. Id. § 3-605(i).
77. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY, §§ 128-29 (1941).
78. See U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(a) & (2) (1989).
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While the rules in revised section 3-605(b), on the one hand,
and in revised sections 3-605(c) and 3-605(d), on the other hand,
may further sensible policies and work well separately, their juxta-
position may create incentives which are counterintuitive, arguably
counterproductive, and not necessarily antitipated by the drafters.
This dissonance becomes most apparent when one contrasts the
treatment under revised section 3-605(c) of creditors who extend
the time of payment for their debtors with the treatment under
revised section 3-605(b) of creditors who release their debtors alto-
gether. It is, quite simply, more risky for a creditor to oblige its
debtor by granting it a slight extension of the due date for a pay-
ment than it is for the creditor to release the debtor outright.
Consider the plight of Holdco, the holder of a $1 million note
issued by Debtco and indorsed by Sureco in order to induce
Holdco to make the loan. The note is payable on or before January
15, 1991. On January 10, the president of Debtco contacts Holdco
and indicates that Debtco will have trouble paying the note on
January 15 and asks for an extension of the time of payment so
that it can work out alternative financing. Investigation by Holdco
reveals that, in fact, Debtco is having a cash flow shortage; how-
ever, if it is given time to liquidate some of its assets not necessary
for the carrying on of its business and reschedule some of its in-
debtedness to other creditors, there is a good chance that Debtco
would be able to pay off the entire balance on the note, including
interest for the period past the due date, by March 1. Moreover, it
appears that even if Debtco is unable to obtain the necessary cash
by March 1, its financial picture would be no worse than on Janu-
ary 15. If Holdco does not grant an extension, however, it is quite
likely that Debtco's default on the note would also constitute a de-
fault on its indebtedness to its other creditors; the likely result,
then, of a refusal to grant an extension, is geometrically increasing
financial pressures on Debtco which would likely result in Debtco's
bankruptcy
Based on this analysis, Holdco would like to give Debtco an
extension so that it will have a chance to sell the nonessential as-
sets and reorder its financial affairs. Is it in Holdco's best interests
to grant the extension to Debtco9
The answer, somewhat surprisingly, is that it may not be in
Holdco's best interests to grant the extension to Debtco. Let us
assume for the moment that Sureco is solvent enough to be able to
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pay the $1 million indebtedness if necessary If Holdco grants the
extension to Debtco, there is a chance that Sureco will be dis-
charged from part of its obligation on the note. According to
revised U.C.C. section 3-605(c), Sureco is discharged to the extent
that it proves that the extension caused it a loss with respect to its
rights of recourse against Debtco.79 While it may not be likely that
Sureco's rights of recourse would be made less valuable by the
granting of an extension and while the burden would be on Sureco
to demonstrate the harm,8 there remains nonetheless the possibil-
ity that the decision of Holdco to extend the due date of Debtco's
payment would cause such harm and would thus discharge Sureco.
Moreover, whether Sureco suffered a loss by reason of the exten-
sion is, presumably, a question of fact which in litigation would be
within the province of a factfinder rather than the court. Thus,
summary judgment against Sureco might be all but impossible. If,
on the other hand, Holdco gave an even greater indulgence to
Debtco-if it released Debtco from its indebtedness alto-
gether-Holdco's claim against Sureco would not be affected.
Accordingly, so long as Sureco is clearly solvent, it may be a better
strategic decision for Holdco to grant Debtco a total release of its
obligations on the note and proceed directly against Sureco than it
is to grant Holdco a relatively brief extension.
Even if the ability of Sureco to pay the indebtedness on the
note is in question, it is still a risky strategy for Holdco to grant
Debtco the extension. Once again, any extension granted to Debtco
might result in the total or partial discharge of Sureco. Thus, it is
less risky for Holdco to refuse Debtco the extension, pursue its
rights against Debtco immediately upon default, and simultane-
ously proceed against Sureco, than it is to grant Debtco the
extension.
The result of the juxtaposition of revised sections 3-605(b) and
3-605(c), then, is to provide a disincentive of sorts for creditors to
reach alternate resolutions with troubled debtors. Rather, when
the accommodation party/surety is clearly solvent, it is safer to
discharge the principal debtor and pursue the surety While such a
surety that pays the creditor has immediate rights to reimburse-
ment and/or subrogation against the debtor, the surety may be
79. See U.C.C. § 3-605(c) & (d) (1990).
80. Id. § 3-605(c) & (d); id. § 3-605 comments 4 & 5.
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either less inclined or less able to allow the principal debtor time
to restructure its affairs. Similarly, when the accommodation
party/surety is not clearly able to pay the indebtedness, the incen-
tive provided by the revised section is to pursue the debtor
immediately, or at least not to grant any enforceable extensions.
It is difficult to see what social or economic policy is furthered
by this comparative disincentive for willing creditors to work with
their debtors to facilitate repayment of their indebtedness and a
return to financial health. Indeed, the drafters themselves indi-
cated that "[s]ettlement is in the interest of sureties as well as the
creditor.""' While the disincentive is ameliorated by requiring the
accommodation party to demonstrate its losses flowing from exten-
sions,82 the disincentive flows from the comparison of the risk-free
alternative of releasing the debtor and pursuing the surety with
the fact that there is risk involved in granting an extension to the
debtor; the existence of the risk is more important than its magni-
tude for these purposes. A creditor who grants an extension has a
sword of Damocles, of sorts, hanging over it and, as Justice Mar-
shall reminded us, "the value of a sword of Damocles is that it
hangs-not that it falls."'83
Of course, the effect of the questionable incentives put into
place by the revised statute is ameliorated by the relatively small
number of situations to which they will apply The vast majority of
negotiable instruments provide in their boilerplate that all makers,
indorsers, and guarantors not only waive presentment, notice of
dishonor and protest, but that they also consent to the release of
any party, extensions of time, release of any collateral and any
other discretionary acts on the part of the payee or other holder.
The changes these waivers and consents effect on Article 3 rules
that would otherwise apply are authorized by U.C.C. section
1-102(3), which allows parties, by agreement, to change any U.C.C.
-rules which are not, by their own terms, unchangeable. 4 The only
exception is that obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonable-
ness and care may not be disclaimed, although they can be
defined. 5 Moreover, under the revised Article 3, such waivers and
81. Id. § 3-605 comment 3.
82. See id. § 3-605(c).
83. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1989).
85. Id.
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consents need not even be carefully drafted. Revised U.C.C. sec-
tion 3-605(i) provides:
A party is not discharged under this section if (i) the party asserting
discharge consents to the event or conduct that is the basis of the
discharge, or (ii) the instrument or a separate agreement of the
party provides for waiver of discharge under this section either spe-
cifically or by general language indicating that the parties waive
defenses based on suretyship or impairment of collateral."6
Thus, a simple statement in a note that all parties to it waive
all suretyship defenses will be sufficient to eliminate the possibility
of discharge under revised section 3-605. Presumably, however,
such a statement would not free a party seeking to enforce the in-
strument against an accommodation party from its obligation to
act in good faith.17
Most such consents or waivers of suretyship defenses are rela-
tively self-explanatory Consents to extensions of the time for
payment were the subject of special statutory rules of interpreta-
tion, however. Former U.C.C. section 3-118(f) provided, in part,
that "[u]nless otherwise specified consent to extension authorizes a
single extension for not longer than the original period."88 This
language was quite straightforward, although there have been occa-
sional cases in which creative arguments have been made as to
what constitutes the original term of the instrument. 9
The revised version of Article 3 has eliminated the rule em-
bodied in former section 3-118(f), and the comments are silent as
to why the rule was eliminated.90 Perhaps the rule was seen as an
anachronism in an era of freedom of contract. Parties consenting
in advance to extensions are apparently now deemed to be able to
protect themselves by limiting the terms of their consent if they so
desire.
Finally, the limited scope of the discharges provided by re-
vised section 3-605 does not mean that the rules provided for the
instruments to which the section does apply are inconsequential.
86. U.C.C. § 3-605(i) (1990).
87. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989).
88. U.C.C. § 3-118(f) (1989).
89. See, e.g., Rogers v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 302 Ark. 353, 789 S.W.2d 463
(1990).
90. See generally U.C.C. art. 3 & Table of Disposition of Sections in Former Article 3
(1990).
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After all, it is for precisely those cases, few though they may be,
that revised section 3-605 was designed." In addition, it must be
remembered that the U.C.C. section 3-605 discharges apply not
only to accommodation parties but also to indorsers. 92 While an
instrument which is being drafted for use in a situation where it is
anticipated that there will be an accommodation party is likely to
contain waivers of suretyship defenses, a relatively informally
drafted instrument for an "IOU" type of situation may not. Yet,
once a simple note of that sort acquires indorsers, there is the pos-
sibility that the suretyship defenses of revised section 3-605 will
come into play
2. Impazrment of Collateral.-Among the more frequently
litigated rules in the suretyship sections of the former Article 3 are
the rules governing the impairment of collateral defense to the
surety's obligation. The theory behind this defense was quite sim-
ple: to the extent that the value of collateral for the debtor's
obligation is impaired, the subrogation rights of the surety have
been made less valuable. 93
To further this policy, former U.C.C. section 3-606 provided
that an accommodation party was discharged to the extent that
the holder "unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument
given by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he
has a right of recourse." '94 The former U.C.C., however, provided
no definition for "impairs" or "unjustifiably," terms which are
hardly self-defining.
The official comments were of little help in this area. The only
guidance was that, "[a]s to when a holder's actions in dealing with
collateral may be "unjustifiable," the section on rights and duties
with respect to collateral in the possession of a secured party (Sec-
tion 9-207) should be consulted. '9 5 U.C.C. section 9-207, however,
is not very illuminating. Essentially, it provides that "[a] secured
party must use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of
collateral in his possession."9
91. See U.C.C. § 3-605 comment 2 (1990).
92. See id. § 3-605(b).
93. See id. § 3-605 comment 6.
94. U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(b) (1989).
95. Id. § 3-606 comment 5.
96. U.C.C. § 9-207(1) (1989). See id. § 9-207 comment I ("[Section 9-207(1)] states the
duty to preserve collateral imposed on a pledge at common law. [T]he duty to exercise
reasonable care may not be disclaimed by agreement, although the parties remain free to
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While section 9-207 addresses physical harm to the collateral,
the most common situations in which accommodation parties have
claimed discharge under former U.C.C. section 3-606(1)(b) have
been cases in which the value of the security interest was dimin-
ished by the secured creditor's failure to perfect, or maintain
perfection of, the security interest.9 7 The courts have generally
ruled that failure to perfect a security interest does constitute un-
justifiable impairment of collateral,98 but the result is hardly
foreordained by the statutory language.
The revised version of Article 3 embodies the impairment of
collateral defense in substantially similar substantive terms, but
clarifies the concept of impairment. Revised U C.C. section 3-
605(e) provides that:
If the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is secured by an
interest in collateral and a person entitled to enforce the instrument
impairs the value of the interest in collateral, the obligation of an
indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse against
the obligor is discharged to the extent of the impairment. The value
of an interest in collateral is impaired to the extent (i) the value of
the interest is reduced to an amount less than the amount of the
right of recourse of the party asserting discharge, or (ii) the reduc
tion in value of the interest causes an increase in the amount by
which the amount of the right of recourse exceeds the value of the
interest. The burden of proving impairment is on the party asserting
discharge. 99
This version of the rule quite precisely determines the extent
of the accommodation party's discharge if there is an impairment
of the value of the collateral. Two formulas are provided, and the
formula to be applied in a particular case is decided by examining
the relationship between the value of the collateral before the im-
pairment and the amount of the accommodation party's right of
recourse.' If, prior to the impairment of collateral, the value of
the collateral exceeded the obligation accommodated but, after the
determine by agreement, in any manner not manifestly unreasonable, what shall constitute
reasonable care in a particular case.").
97. See, e.g., Security Nat'l Bank v. Temarantz, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 157
(N.Y Sup. Ct. 1969); Shaffer v. Davidson, 445 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1968).
98. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Davidson, 445 P.2d 13, 15 (Wyo. 1968).
99. U.C.C. § 3-605(e) (1990).
100. In most circumstances, it would appear that the amount of the right of recourse is
the amount of the debt for which the accommodation party is responsible, because if the
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impairment, the value of the collateral was less than the accommo-
dation, the amount of the impairment is the amount by which the
debt exceeds the post-impairment value of the collateral.101 In
other words, if the accommodation party's right of recourse was
over-secured' 0 2 before the impairment but undersecured after the
impairment, the extent of the impairment is the amount of post-
impairment undersecuredness.
If, on the other hand, the value of the collateral before impair-
ment was less than the debt, the extent of impairment is the
increase in the difference between debt and the value of the collat-
eral.103 In other words, if the accommodation party's right of
recourse was undersecured before the impairment and is rendered
even more undersecured by the impairment, the extent of the im-
pairment is this increase in the amount of undersecuredness.
While the proposed statutory formula is articulated with great
complexity, it appears to do no more than spell out the amount of
damage suffered by an accommodation party when collateral has
been impaired. As such, it is consistent with former law 104
More important, perhaps, is revised U.C.C. section 3-605(g).
According to that section:
[I]mpairing value of an interest in collateral includes (i) failure to
obtain or maintain perfection or recordation of the interest in collat-
eral, (ii) release of collateral without substitution of collateral of
equal value, (iii) failure -to perform a duty to preserve the value of
collateral owed, under Article 9 or other law, to a debtor or surety or
other person secondarily liable, or (iv) failure to comply with appli-
cable law in disposing of collateral.' 5
By providing this list, the revised section has gone beyond the sug-
gestion in the former section that impairment of collateral referred
only to preserving the value of the collateral. 0 6
accommodation party pays that amount, he has a right of recourse against the accommo-
dated party to recover it. See U.C.C. § 3-419 (1990).
101. Id. § 3-605(e).
102. Over-secured, as it is used here, means that the value of the collateral to which
the accommodation party would succeed through its subrogation rights exceeds the claim
against the accommodation party on its obligation on the instrument.
103. See U.C.C. § 3-605(e) (1990).
104. See U.C.C. § 3-606(i)(b) (1989).
105. U.C.C. § 3-605(g) (1990).
106. See U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(b) & comment 5 (1989).
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Of particular interest is the fourth example of impairment:
"failure to comply with applicable law in disposing of the collat-
eral."' 7 This is a reference to the rules in Part 5 of Article 9.
U C.C. section 9-504, for example, requires that "every aspect of
the disposition [of collateral] including the method, manner, time,
place and terms must be commercially reasonable."' ls It has not
always been clear to courts that the disposition of collateral could
give rise to an impairment of collateral claim.'
The reference to the Article 9 rules on disposition of collateral
also sets up an interesting conflict. U.C.C. section 9-501(3) pro-
vides that a debtor generally cannot waive the protections of Part
5 of Article 9. ' 0 Many courts have held that guarantors and other
accommodation parties qualify as "debtors" for purposes of the
protections granted by sections 9-501 and 9-504."' Yet, revised
U.C.C. section 3-605(i) provides that the defense of impairment of
collateral can be waived." 2 Does that rule take precedence over Ar-
ticle 9 with respect to accommodation parties who qualify as
debtors9 If the answer is yes, a surety who guarantees an instru-
ment by signing a separate guaranty has greater rights than one
who guarantees on the instrument. The former guarantor is not an
accommodation party and would not, therefore, be governed by
Article 3;113 thus, the unwaivable rules of U.C.C. section 9-504(3)
would prevail. The latter guarantor, however, would be able to
waive his or her rights pursuant to revised U.C.C. section 3-605(i).
C Suretyship Defenses for Sureties Who Are Not
Accommodation Parties
Revised U C.C. section 3-605 also provides an interesting rule
governing one common law suretyship situation which does not in-
volve either accommodation parties or indorsers. If two parties are
107. U.C.C. § 3-605(g) (1990).
108. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1989).
109. See, e.g., FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990).
110. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1989) (detailing those protections which can and cannot be
waived by a debtor).
111. See, e.g., First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Parsons, 390 So. 2d 640 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1980), rev d on other grounds, 426 So. 2d 416 (Ala. 1982). See also U.C.C. §§ 9-501
& 9-504 (1989).
112. U.C.C. § 3-605(i) (1990).
113. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
616 [Vol. 42:2:595
Suretyship Principles
jointly and severally liable for an obligation and, as between them-
selves, each one is responsible for a portion of the obligation, then
each party is a surety to the extent that he or she is liable to the
obligee for that portion of the obligation for which the other is pri-
marily responsible.11" Thus, comakers of a note, for example, are
common law sureties for each other even if neither has signed as
an accommodation party "I
Revised U.C.C. section 3-605(f) governs one possible surety-
ship defense in this context. The section provides, in part, that
[i]f the obligation of a party is secured by an interest in collateral
not provided by an accommodation party and a person entitled to
enforce the instrument impairs the value of the interest in collateral,
the obligation of any party who is jointly and severally liable with
respect to the secured obligation is discharged to the extent the im-
pairment causes the party asserting discharge to pay more than that
party would have been obliged to pay, taking into account rights of
contribution, if impairment had not occurred.11
While this language is somewhat turgid, it yields its meaning
when attacked with perseverance. Let us say, for example,' 7 that
Michael and Martha are comakers of a $1000 note. According to
revised U.C.C. section 3-116(a), they are jointly and severally liable
on their contracts as issuers of a note." 8 As between themselves,
however, Michael and Martha are each liable for one-half of the
$1000, or $500. Let us further assume that Martha has given collat-
eral worth at least $1000 to secure the debt but the payee failed to
perfect the security interest before Martha's bankruptcy The
payee's failure would, of course, constitute impairment of collateral
under revised U.C.C. section 3-605(g), and would render the secur-
ity interest unenforceable against Martha's bankruptcy trustee." 9
114. This is a suretyship situation because two parties owe the obligation to the obli-
gee who is entitled to only one performance and, as between the two obligors, one is
primarily responsible for the obligation. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY § 82
(1941).
115. Under revised section 3-116(a), comakers are jointly and severally liable on the
instrument. If one of the comakers signed the instrument for the purpose of incurring liabil-
ity without being a direct beneficiary of the value given for the instrument, of course, that
comaker is an accommodation party. U.C.C. § 3-116(a) (1990).
116. Id. § 3-605(f).
117. This example draws heavily from official comment 7 to revised section 3-605. See
id. § 3-605 comment 7.
118. See id. §§ 3-116(a) & 3-412.
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
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If the payee succeeded in collecting the full $1000 from
Michael, Michael would be subrogated to the payee's rights against
Martha to the extent of his right to contribution from her. Martha,
however, is bankrupt. Had the payee perfected the security inter-
est, Michael would have been able to recover the $500 contribution
that Martha owed him from the collateral. Instead, Michael is left
with whatever pittance he will get from the trustee. Thus, Michael
was damaged to the extent that his recovery from the trustee falls
short of $500.
Revised U.C.C. section 3-605(f) compensates Michael for this
harm by discharging him from liability on the instrument to the
extent that his loss of subrogation rights against the collateral
would result in him paying more money with respect to the instru-
ment.120 Thus, if Martha's estate has no assets, Michael has been
harmed by $500, and his liability on the instrument would be re-
duced by $500.
Matters get more complicated, however, if Martha's estate has
some assets. Assume, for example, that Martha's estate has $5000
and, in addition to the indebtedness owed with respect to the note
with Michael, there are claims totalling $9,500. If the payee tries to
collect the entire $1000 owed on the note from Michael, what are
Michael's rights9 He would have a $500 claim against Martha's es-
tate for contribution, bringing the total claims against her to
$10,000. Since the total assets available for distribution in
Martha's estate are $5000, or 50% of $10,000, it would appear that
Michael could recover 50% of $500, or $250. Thus, there would be
a $250 shortfall in his contribution claim. 1 ' By operation of re-
vised U C.C. section 3-605(f), it would appear that Michael would
be discharged to the extent of $250. Yet, there are more complica-
tions. First, if the payee can recover only $750 from Michael, he
will have a claim against Martha's estate for the remaining $250,
throwing off some of the earlier calculations as to the payments
made by Martha's estate. In addition, if Michael only pays $750 on
the note, shouldn't his claim for contribution be only $3759 If so,
this would also affect the earlier calculations. The drafters appear
to have been only vaguely aware, if they were aware at all, of these
complications. The official comment merely states that "[i]f some
120. U.C.C. § 3-605(f) (1990).
121. $500 - $250 = $250.
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amount is payable on unsecured claims, the loss is reduced by the
amount receivable by [Michael]."'1 22 Apparently the bankruptcy
courts will be left to sort this problem out.
As stated above, Michael, who is a party to the instrument, is
a surety but not an accommodation party The drafters of revised
Article 3 have chosen to codify Michael's defense of impairment of
collateral. What about other suretyship defenses of comakers such
as Michael, who are sureties but not accommodation parties? None
of the other discharges in revised U.C.C. section 3-605 are available
to such parties because they are not accommodation parties. Does
this mean that if the payee granted Martha an extension of the
due date for her obligation on the note that Michael would not
have the benefit of any suretyship defenses?
Most likely, the opposite is true. With the exception of revised
section 3-605(f), the U.C.C. does not provide rules governing sure-
tyship defenses of parties who are sureties but not accommodation
parties. A strong case can therefore be made that such parties are
protected by the common law of suretyship. The common law, of
course, can be imported by application of U.C.C. section 1-103.123
Since revised Article 3 deviates considerably from the common law
of suretyship, however, there is the potential for some dissonance
here. For example, Michael, as a surety who is not an accommoda-
tion party, would be discharged to the extent of his suretyship
obligation ($500) if the payee discharged Martha without Michael's
consent and without reserving rights against him. If Michael were
an accommodation party for Martha, however, he would not be
discharged by her discharge. 124 It is doubtful that the drafters in-
tended or desired such anomalies.
D. Against Whom May Suretyship Defenses Be Asserted?
Under both former and revised Article 3, suretyship defenses
of an accommodation party are not available against the actions of
122. U.C.C. § 3-605 comment 7 (1990).
123. Section 1-103 provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisibns of this Act, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
U.C.C. § 1-103 (1989).
124. See U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1990). See also supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
1991] 619
Alabama Law Review
certain innocent holders.'25 Under former Article 3, suretyship de-
fenses could not be asserted against a holder in due course without
notice of the accommodation.2 6 There were two ways under former
Article 3 that an accommodation party could demonstrate that the
holder in due course had notice of the accommodation. First, the
accommodation party could prove whatever facts were necessary in
order for the holder's state of knowledge to qualify as "notice"
under U C.C. section 1-201(25). 11 7 Second, and much easier, the ac-
commodation indorser could show that his indorsement "shows
that it is not in the chain of title;" such an indorsement was statu-
torily deemed to give notice of its accommodation character. 28
The revised version of Article 3 continues the protection of
innocent holders and extends it even further. Under the revised
Article, an accommodation party cannot be discharged by applica-
tion of suretyship defenses "unless the person entitled to enforce
the instrument knows of the accommodation or has notice under
Section 3-419(c) that the instrument was signed for accommoda-
tion."' 29 Note that anyone seeking to enforce the instrument-not
just a holder in due course-is protected against suretyship de-
fenses. Not only has the class of protected parties been widened
from holders in due course to all holders, but it is more difficult for
the accommodation party to exclude a holder from that protection.
While the former Article excluded all holders in due course with
notice of the accommodation,' 3° the revised Article only excludes a
holder or other enforcer of the instrument if he or she "knows of
the accommodation or has notice under Section 3-419(c).''
125. Of course, to the extent that a suretyship defense is also available to indorsers,
and the accommodation party is an indorser, the suretyship defense will be available in any
event.
126. Former section 3-415(3) provided, in part, that: "As against a holder in due
course and without notice of the accommodation oral proof of the accommodation is not
admissible to give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent on his
character as such." U.C.C. § 3-415(3) (1989). Comment 1 to that section indicated that
"oral" proof was probably intended to include all parol proof including, apparently, contem-
poraneous writings apart from the instrument. Id. § 3-415 comment 1.
127. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1989).
128. U.C.C. § 3-415(4) (1989).
129. U.C.C. § 3-605(h) (1990).
130. See U.C.C. § 3-415(3) & comment 1 (1989).
131. U.C.C. § 3-605(h) (1990) (emphasis added). Revised U.C.C. section 3-419(3) pro-
vides, in part, that:
A person signing the instrument is presumed to be an accommodation party and
there is notice that the instrument is signed for accommodation if the signature is an
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The change to protecting all parties seeking to enforce an in-
strument, not just holders in due course, against unwitting
discharge of an accommodation party is a good step. The policy
decision under former Article 3 to limit protection against nonob-
vious accommodation parties to holders in due course was not well
reasoned. Rather, it appears it was a knee-jerk application of the
principle that ordinary holders are subject to all defenses of the
parties to an instrument. 32 The question here, however, is not
whether the holder is free of a particular suretyship defense but,
rather, whether the holder's conduct creates the defense. The dis-
tinction-between holders in due course and those to whom we do
not give that favored status-makes sense to determine when a
holder takes free of defenses created by the acts of others. It
makes less sense, though as a basis to distinguish between holders
in due course and other parties seeking to enforce an instrument as
to whether their later conduct unwittingly creates a defense. The
failure of a holder to fulfill the criteria for holder in due course
status does not have any obvious relevance in determining the con-
sequence of later innocent conduct by that holder. That, of course,
is the subject of revised section 3-605(h). 33 Thus, the elimination
of the holder in due course requirement is a good decision.
The second change from former U.C.C. section 3-415(3) to re-
vised section 3-605(h) is that under the former section a holder in
due course was subject to the U.C.C. suretyship defenses of the
accommodation party if the holder in due course had notice of the
accommodation status of that party As elaborated above, an in-
dorsement out of the chain of title was deemed to give the holder
notice of the accommodation status of the indorsement. 34 More-
over, an accommodation party was free to demonstrate that the
holder "from all the facts and circumstances known to him
[had] reason to know" that the accommodation party was such.13 5
anomalous indorsement or is accompanied by words indicating that the signer is act-
ing as surety or guarantor with respect to the obligation of another party to the
instrument.
Id. § 3-419(3). Revised U.C.C. section 3-205(d), in turn, defines an "anomalous indorse-
ment" as one "made by a person that is not the holder of the instrument." Id. § 3-205(d).
132. See U.C.C. § 3-306 (1989).
133. U.C.C. § 3-605(h) (1990).
134. See id. § 3-415(4) (1989).
135. U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c) (1989).
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This state of facts is, of course, the primary U.C.C. definition of
",notice. 1 3 6
Under revised U.C.C. section 3-605(h), though, plain ordinary
garden-variety notice is insufficient to subject one seeking to en-
force an instrument to defenses based on a party's accommodation
status. Rather, the holder or other enforcer is subject to the surety-
ship defenses of the accommodation party only if the holder either
knows of the accommodation status or has a narrow species of stat-
utorily defined notice in revised U.C.C. section 3-419(c).137
"Knowledge," of course, is "actual knowledge,"'1 38 a higher stan-
dard than "reason to know" Revised U.C.C. section 3-419(c)
provides, in relevant part:
A person signing an instrument is presumed to be an accommoda-
tion party and there is notice that the instrument is signed for
accommodation if the signature is an anomalous indorsement or is
accompanied by words indicating that the signer is acting as surety
or guarantor with respect to the obligation of another party to the
instrument."13
The distinction is important. Consider, for example, a $5000
term note with two comakers, Lex Docent and his mother, Ida Do-
cent, payable to the order of the University of Alabama. The note,
bearing the blank indorsements of the University of Alabama and
Deep South Collections, a collection agency, is now in the posses-
sion of Ginco, an independent debt collector specializing in
difficult cases. When Ginco obtained the note from Deep South
Collections, he learned only one fact about it-Lex was a student
at the University of Alabama Law School at the time the note was
issued. Based on these facts, the note probably represents the re-
payment obligation on a student loan and Ida is probably an
accommodation maker. Accordingly, it is probably accurate to say
that Ginco had "reason to know" of Ida's status as an accommoda-
tion party But did Ginco "know" that Ida is an accommodation
party9 Certainly not. After all, as far as Ginco knows, Lex and Ida
could have had some sort of joint obligation to the university or
some other reason to issue a note as comakers. While Ginco has
136. See id.
137. U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1990). See id. § 3-419(c).
138. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1989).
139. U.C.C. § 3-419(c) (1990).
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"reason to know" that Ida is an accommodation party, it would be
inaccurate to say that he "knows" it. Thus, Ginco would not dis-
charge Ida, even if she is an accommodation party, by taking any
of the actions described in revised U.C.C. section 3-605 which dis-
charge accommodation parties.140
As indicated above, a holder or. other party seeking to enforce
an instrument is also subject to an accommodation party's de-
fenses if the holder has notice under revised U.C.C. section
3-419(c).' 4 Section 3-419(c) seems straightforward. A party is
deemed to have notice that an instrument was signed as an accom-
modation if it bears an anomalous indorsement or if a signature is
"accompanied by words indicating that the signer is acting as
surety or guarantor with respect to the obligation of another party
to the instrument.1 42 A signature accompanied by words of surety-
ship or guaranty obviously gives subsequent parties notice of its
accommodation status, but the concept of anomalous indorsements
is not as obvious.
Revised U.C.C. section 3-205(d) defines an anomalous indorse-
ment as one "made by a person that is not the holder of the
instrument.' ' 43 This definition is similar, but not identical, to the
former Article 3 concept of an indorsement out of the chain of ti-
tle.14 4 The difference can be important, though, as some examples
will illustrate.
First, consider an easy example-a note issued by Mayco to
the order of Patton. The back of the note bears the blank indorse-
ments of Garrison and Patton, in that order; Howell now has
possession of the note. Garrison's indorsement is an anomalous in-
dorsement because Garrison was not the holder at the time of
indorsement-until Patton indorsed, only Patton could be a
holder. 45 Therefore, there is notice of Garrison's status as an ac-
commodation party under revised U.C.C. section 3-419.146
Similarly, Garrison's indorsement was out of the chain of title and,
140. See id. § 3-605.
141. See id. §§ 3-605(h) & 3-419(c).
142. Id. § 3-419(c).
143. Id. § 3-205(d).
144. See U.C.C. § 3-415(4) (1989).
145. See U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1989).
146. See U.C.C. § 3-419(c) (1990).
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therefore, would give notice of its accommodation status under for-
mer U C.C. section 3-415.147
Not all examples are so easy, however. Consider the following
cases:
(a) A note was issued by Miller to the order of Becker. The
back of the note contains Becker's blank indorsement 148 fol-
lowed by the blank indorsements of Anderson and Thompson.
The current holder, Pines, purchased the instrument from
Thompson, who did not tell Pines anything about Anderson.
(b) A bearer note149 was issued by Spero. The back of the note
contains the blank indorsements of Romanick and Bona. The
current holder, Dorsky, purchased the instrument from Bona,
who did not tell Dorsky anything about Romanick.
Are the indorsements of Anderson and Romanick anomalous
indorsements9 Remember, an anomalous indorsement is one made
by a party who was not a holder.1 50 Thus, these indorsements were
anomalous if Anderson and Romanick were not holders at the time
of their indorsements. Were these indorsements made by holders9
Unlike the case with respect to Garrison's indorsement in the pre-
vious example, this question cannot be answered simply by
examining the instruments. At the time of the indorsements in
question, both instruments were "bearer paper." As a result, any-
one in possession of one of the instruments was a holder. Thus,
Anderson and Romanick may have been holders of the notes (they
were holders if they ever had possession of the notes) but they may
not have been holders of the notes (if they never had possession of
them). The question cannot be answered solely from examination
147. See U.C.C. § 3-415(4) (1989).
148. See id. § 3-204(2) ("An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee.");
U.C.C. § 3-205(b) (1990) ("If an indorsement is made by the holder of an instrument and it
is not a special indorsement, it is a 'blank indorsement. When indorsed in blank, an instru-
ment becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until
specially indorsed.").
149. See U.C.C. § 3-111 (1989) ("An instrument is payable to bearer when by its terms
it is payable to (a) bearer or the order of bearer; or (b) a specified person or bearer; or (c)
'cash' or the order of 'cash, or any other indication which does not purport to designate a
specific payee."); U.C.C. § 3-109(a) (1990) ("A promise or order is payable to bearer if it: (1)
states that it is payable to bearer or otherwise indicates that the person in possession
is entitled to prepayment; (2) does not state a payee; or (3) states that it is payable to
cash or otherwise indicates that it is not payable to an identified person.").
150. U.C.C. § 3-205(d) (1990).
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of the instruments. Thus, a holder cannot tell if Anderson and
Romanck were anomalous indorsers solely from examining the
instruments.
The ambiguous status of the indorsements reflects the ambi-
guity of the underlying situation. Perhaps, in the first example,
Becker negotiated the note to Anderson who added his valid but
unnecessary indorsement and negotiated the note to Thompson. In
such case, Anderson was not an accommodation party and, because
he was a holder, his indorsement was not anomalous. On the other
hand, perhaps Becker had sought to discount the note to Thomp-
son, 151 who had refused to go through with the transaction unless
Anderson also became liable on the instrument by indorsing it.152
In that case, Anderson was an accommodation party and, because
she was not a holder at the time of her indorsement, her indorse-
ment was anomalous.
If, as in the second scenario described above, Anderson's in-
dorsement was anomalous, then Pines is deemed by revised section
3-419(c) to have notice that Anderson indorsed as an accommoda-
tion party Notice of Anderson's accommodation status under
section 3-419(c), in turn, subjects Pines to Anderson's suretyship
defenses under revised U.C.C. section 3-605.111 But did Pines really
have notice that Anderson was an accommodation party9 For all
Pines could tell from the note, Anderson could have been a holder
who obtained the instrument from Becker and negotiated it to
Thompson. Must Pines do independent investigation off the face
of the instrument to determine her rights vis-a-vis Anderson? Es-
pecially if she is a holder in due course, this seems unfair. Should
she guess? Should she assume the worst?
The definition of "anomalous indorsement" is not up to the
task at hand here. Perhaps the statute would have been better
crafted if it defined an anomalous indorsement as an indorsement
"(a) of an order instrument by a party other than one to whose
order the instrument is payable, or (b) which the party seeking to
enforce the instrument has notice was made by a party who was
not a holder of the instrument." Part (a) of that definition would
151. In other words, Becker sought to negotiate the note to Thompson in exchange for
consideration less than the amount payable. In such a transaction, Becker would receive less
than he would if the note were paid, but he would receive it earlier.
152. See U.C.C. § 3-414 (1989); U.C.C. § 3-415 (1990).
153. See U.C.C. § 3-605 (1990).
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resolve most situations, while in the unusual situations part (b)
would subject subsequent holders to suretyship defenses only if
they knew, or had reason to know, that the indorser was not a
holder.
V CONCLUSION
Revised Article 3 makes significant changes in the law gov-
erning sureties on negotiable instruments. Many of the changes are
designed to clarify a body of law which has been confusing and
unnecessarily complicated. For the most part, these changes are
successful, although there is occasionally still some room for uncer-
tainty A few of the changes make substantive changes in the
rights of creditors and sureties. The changes, especially in the area
of "suretyship defenses," are bold and innovative. At times, how-
ever, unintended consequences of the drafters' choices may prove
troublesome. Nonetheless, as a whole, the revised provisions ap-
pear to represent significant improvement over former law As
suretyship continues to be utilized in an ever-increasing number of
credit transactions, the new rules will be frequently tested. The
performance of the revised rules on those tests will be their true
evaluation.
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